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Decision  aiding  practice  has  stimulated  much  research  on  neglected  scientiﬁc  issues.  The author  spent
40  years  alternating  between  consulting  and  diverse  faculty  appointments  in management,  statistics,
economics,  psychology,  information  technology  and  public  policy.  His  decision  science  research,  with
applied  decision  theory  at its  conceptual  core,  is published,  often  with  academic  co-authors,  in the  lit-
eratures  on decision  theory,  cognitive  psychology,  philosophy,  and  organization  design.  A number  ofrescription
pplied decision theory
ecision aiding practice
the  author’s  ideas  and  insights,  grounded  in  “anecdotal  evidence”  stemming  from  over  100  cases,  are
discussed  here.  These  ideas  cover,  for example,  hybrid  judgment,  decomposing  estimation  error  ideal
judgment,  organization  ﬁt and  evaluating  decision  aids.  Avenues  for future  research  are  outlined.  Settled
science will  require  more  deﬁnitive  research.
©  2015  Society  for Applied  Research  in Memory  and  Cognition.  Published  by Elsevier Inc.  This is an
 articopen  access
Behavioral scientist Fischhoff (2013) illustrates the relationship
etween decision theory and practice with the following question:
The real world: What use is it?” My  answer is: Plenty, if you want
o use decision aids to improve that world. I have spent a long
areer trying to do that. Decision aiding – and applied decision
heory in particular – promises to greatly enhance the effective-
ess of individual and institutional decisions, but it is still quite
rimitive and needs countless reﬁnements (perhaps even radical
hanges) before it comes close to realizing that promise (Brown,
992). Effective decision technology (broadly interpreted) calls for
igniﬁcant advances in psychological normative and organizational
heory. Decision-aiding practice can contribute fruitful direction
nd seed promising research. The following is my  view on a wide
ariety of research issues that could make a real difference. I will
iscuss some projects, cite others and reference papers that give
ore detailed treatment.
. Background
.1. Unorthodox scopeThis paper will, no doubt, be unlike others in this special issue, in
hat it does not conform to what is commonly expected in a scien-
iﬁc journal. It does not address a single, well-deﬁned issue, sharply
∗ Tel.: +1 703 620 2443.
E-mail address: rexvbrown@gmail.com
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2015.07.005
211-3681/© 2015 Society for Applied Research in Memory and Cognition. Published by
reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).le  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by-nc-nd/4.0/).
focused on a particular disciplinary topic. Instead, it reports on
exploratory inquiries, whose unifying theme is a class of practical
problems. It does not purport to report ﬁndings that are univer-
sally and eternally applicable, nor grounded ﬁrmly in theoretical
or empirical research. Instead, it reports on the experience, albeit
extensive and varied, of one decision aider-researcher – myself –
and it takes research ideas no further than I have needed to address
client dilemmas cost-effectively.
Environmental policy scholar Morgan (1978) has persuasively
argued that good policy calls for bad science. In other words, for
policy purposes, the science only needs to be “good enough” to
support decision tools that are used by – and useful to – a decider.
Findings do not need to be ﬁrm enough and thoroughly enough
documented so that a scientiﬁc audience can conﬁdently accept
them and expect that experimental results can be replicated. Many
policy-makers and other deciders may  not be willing to pay the
cost and delay associated with such veriﬁable certitude. To illus-
trate this point, consider the following case. (Terms: A “case” really
happened; an “example” is hypothetical.)
Clean air legislation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
was mandated by Congress to evaluate whether the Clean Air
Act was  worth its cost. My  company, Decision Science Consor-
tium, Inc. (DSC), a small decision consulting and research company,
was charged with orchestrating the study (Brown, 1991). We  con-
structed a “macro-model” whose input was to be provided by
various scientiﬁc bodies. Major research organizations such as
national labs and the US Geological Survey were to provide us
with expert input, such as what the Act’s impact would be on
 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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gricultural interests or auto industry economics. Without excep-
ion, they refused to provide us with any ﬁndings until these met
ests of scientiﬁc publishability. Before any of these subcontrac-
ors were satisﬁed, control of Congress passed from Democrat to
epublican and the whole project was scrapped.
Philosopher Good (1963) advocated a “Journal of Partly-Baked
deas”. As a decision aider, I would be an avid consumer of such
deas, though Good may  have valued them more for their contri-
ution to deﬁnitive science than to practical decision aiding. The
resent paper should ﬁt well in a journal with such a name. Prac-
ical necessity may  have led me  to these partly-baked ideas in the
rst place; but they may  now also serve to advance conventional
cientiﬁc objectives.
.2. Autobiographic basis
The basis of these thoughts is purely autobiographic: My
fty year career interleaved decision consulting with university
eaching and research. As a consultant, I applied decision-aiding
ethods, mainly derived from applied decision theory, to over 100
iverse dilemmas, throughout government and business, often at
he highest levels, including heads of agencies. As an academic, I
erved on various normative and descriptive university faculties. I
o not have the cognitive psychology training or academic orienta-
ion of, I expect, most readers of this essay. My  main formal training
as in statistical decision theory, but real world experience has
aught me  that it is more important to understand how people do
ehave than how they would behave if they obeyed logical norms.
 have acquired a selective smattering of cognitive psychology by
onferring and collaborating with academics in that ﬁeld.
I am a technologist, not a scientist. I apply whatever science I
ave available, however tentative, to a practical problem; in this
ase, to make wise decisions in an organizational context. In the
ourse of so doing, I may  stumble on gaps or inadequacies in the
cientiﬁc canon, which I can formulate as questions for the scientiﬁc
ommunity to pursue, along with guesses of my  own  – hypotheses
f you will – about where a scientiﬁc solution may  lie.
. Prescriptive research needs
.1. Distinctive features of prescription-oriented research
Effective prescription, or decision adding, may  be advanced by
ono-disciplinary research; be it purely descriptive or purely nor-
ative (Bell, Raiffa, & Tversky, 1988). In these cases, the nature
f the research is not essentially different from the research nor-
ally carried out in traditional departments, such as psychology,
rganizational behavior and statistics, and is governed by similar
areer incentives (although the topics may  differ quite markedly
rom those currently pursued).
Much prescription-oriented research, however, is more rad-
cally distinctive in being interdisciplinary, and less readily
ccommodated by existing academic institutions. We  decision
echnologists have a pervasive interest in evaluating the perfor-
ance of candidate decision aids in terms of both their logical rigor
a normative issue) and their human implementability (a descrip-
ive issue). Wise aid design requires trading off one consideration
gainst the other (an interdisciplinary issue).
Suppose a decider is interested in updating probabilities in
he light of new evidence. Should he assess the required “poste-
ior” probability directly or use Bayes theorem to compute it from
he information required by this theorem? Descriptive research
ay  ﬁnd (as I suspect) that humans are not very good at mak-
ng imaginary assessments (such as the probability for obtaining
he evidence, if a hypothesis is or isn’t true). Research may  ﬁndmory and Cognition 4 (2015) 212–220 213
that, given sound input assessments, some Bayesian algorithm
outperforms unaided intuition. Interdisciplinary research is needed
to judge whether or not this improvement is outweighed by loss
due to unsound input.
2.2. Deciders’ avoidance of applied decision theory models
Deciders’ use of quantitative applied decision theory and other
formal decision aid has, so far, been surprisingly small, given
the initial optimism of the 1950s (Brown, 1992). A number of
highly trained decision analysts, who  later became deciders in
organizations, confessed that they never use a quantiﬁed model
when making their own decisions. These deciders include: Grayson
(1973), author of what was probably the ﬁrst published case study
in applied decision theory and former chairman of the Federal Price
Control Board; Andrew Kahr, a theoretical pioneer in the origi-
nal applied decision theory group at Harvard (of which I was a
junior member), who  became a highly successful ﬁnancier; and Jim
Edwards, an ex-student of mine at Harvard Business School, who
became chairman of ICF, Inc. a billion dollar corporation. Even I
myself almost never use a quantiﬁed decision model on my  private
decisions and rarely put them before my consulting clients, at least
as a decision aid. Although decision modeling is commonly used
in business (Ulvila & Brown, 1982), government (Brown, 1987),
medical and other organizations, according to my  experience the
motivation is hardly ever to help deciders to make better decisions.
Instead, the main purpose seems to be to validate or explain pro-
posed and past decisions to others (see chapter 2 of Brown, 2005b).
Nevertheless, deciders have uniformly credited their decision mod-
eling training with honing their intuition and informal reasoning
(Brown, 2012).
2.3. Dearth of prescription-oriented research
I attribute the deciders’ neglect of applied decision the-
ory models, at least partly, to inadequate state-of-the-art of
prescription-oriented science, that is, science that is targeted at
improved practical decision-making. In the mid-1980s I became
concerned about a possible mismatch between current decision
science and decision practice. DSC arranged a short conference
(funded by the Ofﬁce of Naval Research) at the National Academy
of Sciences, where scientists and decision aiders discussed syn-
ergy between them (Tolcott & Holt, 1988). The scientists included
leading academics, such as Amos Tversky and Herbert Simon. The
aiders were commissioners of decision aid in the military. Confer-
ence participants could identify (at least on-the-spot) only a couple
of research efforts over the previous 20 years that had been used
in operational decision aiding practice, such as inﬂuence diagrams
(Howard & Matheson, 1984).
To be used and useful, decision aid has to be interdisciplinary.
It needs to be logically sound, cognitively realistic, organization-
ally appropriate, and take advantage of the best practical skill and
knowledge available in the particular application domain, such
as business or medicine. Professional and academic institutions,
however, reward the mono-disciplinarian. This difference is akin
to the situation in medicine, where general medical practitioners
arguably make the greatest difference to the health of the popu-
lation, while prestige and ﬁnancial rewards go to the specialists.
A contrary and more encouraging analogy would be music, where
the conductor is rewarded more highly than the ﬁrst violin.
I was  not able to lure some of the keenest scientiﬁc minds into
interdisciplinary prescriptive science. When I tried to interest Her-
bert Simon, Amos Tversky and James March into redirecting their
impressive intellects into decision aiding all three agreed that that
this activity was  important and encouraged me  to pursue it. (Over
weekly lunches, Simon would quiz me  on how his theories fared in
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he real-world.) However, they all pleaded that that kind of research
as not for them.
.4. My  prescriptive research history
Some account of how my  own career evolved may cast light on
ow decision-aiding practice can lead to relevant innovations in the
nderlying science – though I far from suggesting this is anything
ike a general career template.
From adolescence, I have always had, as a career objective, to
mprove the wisdom of my  own and others’ behavior and the judg-
ents behind it. In the early years, my  focus was on seeking out and
bsorbing scientiﬁc knowledge that served that end. In later years,
 have focused on adding scientiﬁc knowledge that contributes to
hat end.
Initially, I sought out relevant academic subjects to learn. I
xplored, but soon abandoned, two promising programs that, at
ambridge at least, I found too disconnected from the real life I
as preparing for. Logic was too abstract and Psychology was too
eurological. I ended up with an eclectic combination of economics,
ocial anthropology and statistics, which proved useful later in my
ecision aiding, in business management, organization design and
pplied decision theory, respectively.
I returned to decision aiding career at a UK management consul-
ing company. Having no management experience, I reasoned that
he only way to be of use to seasoned decision-makers was to con-
ribute a logical statistics-based decision process. Failing to ﬁnd any
igniﬁcant work or interest in that area in British academia, I took
 few months off to try to develop something myself, with a Man-
gement Studies Group at Cambridge. Then I learned that advanced
pplied decision theory was already being developed by Raiffa and
chlaifer (1968) at Harvard. I sent them a paper on my  tentative
deas. After pointing out in detail its theoretical ﬂaws, they invited
e into their group, where I spent the next ﬁve years learning their
ecision tools and teaching them to MBAs.
However, my  and others’ attempts to use these tools on real
usiness decisions proved quite disappointing. I attributed this to
ur group’s pre-occupation with logically rigorous models, without
egard to human capacity to supply input or use output. I moved to
he University of Michigan for four years, to learn from psycholo-
ists working on relevant behavioral issues (see von Winterfeldt &
dwards, 1986).
I returned to full-time decision aiding in 1973, primarily aiding
overnment executives in Washington, and eventually co-founded
 consulting and research company, Decision Science Consortium,
nc (DSC). It was here that I switched from simply applying current
ecision science to building on it to make decision-aiding more
ffective. This involved drawing, as needed, on academic experts in
elevant ﬁelds and, from time to time, taking up visiting appoint-
ents at leading research centers (for instance, Social and Decision
ciences at Carnegie-Mellon, Bayesian statistics at University Col-
ege London and Organization Psychology at the London School of
conomics).
My research strategy has had a common pattern. When in con-
ulting mode, I normally devoted half a day a week to seeding
esearch, funded by a research agency, such as NSF or ONR1. It
nvolved reﬂecting on researchable issues generated during the
ther 4.5 days a week, which were devoted to addressing the
lients’ practical dilemmas. I would note a need in available deci-
ion aiding technology. I would seek an aiding ﬁx,  drawing on what
 knew of available science. If I found the science lacking, I would
1 For research papers that are not in refereed publications nor available through
TIS  (National Technical Information Service) or SSRN (Social Sciences Research
etwork), contact me  at rexvbrown@gmail.com.mory and Cognition 4 (2015) 212–220
try to formulate a research lead and initiate a research inquiry (my
own  or others’) to follow that lead.
I would pursue the inquiry only so far as I judged it to be cost-
effective for aid development. This was  often no further than an
exploratory inquiry to produce plausible hypotheses that I could
base a usable aid ﬁx on. The inquiry might incidentally seed more
deﬁnitive scientiﬁc research (including hypothesis testing) by oth-
ers. At the core of developing a research lead, I often noted a
puzzle and sought an explanatory answer (what philosophers call
“explicandum-explicatum”). Having devised a ﬁx, I would update
my tool-kit for aiding practice, which I would apply to new client
dilemmas, and repeat the whole process, along the lines of the
familiar engineering dictum: “build-test-build-test.” The next sec-
tion will illustrate this strategy through some examples.
3. Illustrative seeding research
The following is a discussion of illustrative issues on which col-
leagues and I have done exploratory research. Appendix A lists
other prescriptive research efforts, which may  also merit more
scientiﬁc development and generalization2. (See also proposed
descriptive, normative and prescriptive research agendas in Brown
and Vari (1992) and Brown (1989).)
3.1. Hybrid judgment
Puzzle. As a consultant, I had long observed that professionals
and academics normally use a single approach to analysing a deci-
sion – for instance, they accept the output of a single mathematical
model. On the other hand, successful deciders invariably look at an
issue several different ways (which includes use of their intuition)
and merge the often conﬂicting results. That is, they use hybrid
judgment – which we  originally called plural evaluation.
Answer. It appears to be a question of motivation. Hybrid judg-
ment is usually the wisest course for deciders, who  are interested
primarily in desirable outcomes. They would want to use all avail-
able knowledge and considerations. Technical groups, on the other
hand, are typically motivated to conduct ﬂawless analysis, for
example, to avoid criticism from technical peers. One three-quarter
baked approach was  likely to have fewer embarrassing ﬂaws than
two half-baked approaches.
Research leads and inquiry. I started on a long path to develop
hybrid reasoning, covering both how to design analysis and how to
interpret the results. After toying with some plausible hypotheses
on my  own, I realized that I did not have the mathematical statis-
tics to pursue the issue effectively. I spent six months working with
statistical decision theorist Dennis Lindley on this and other nor-
mative issues, at University College, London. We  formulated some
basic logic and paradigms for hybrid analysis (Brown & Lindley,
1978) and developed our ideas over the next few years (Brown &
Lindley, 1982; Brown & Lindley, 1986). Back at DSC, I began using
hybrid reasoning on virtually all consulting projects and have done
so ever since. Lindley continued to work in London on normative
paradigms as a consultant to DSC (Lindley, 1985, 1987).
Need. However, I found that clients and others had difﬁculty
eliciting the uncertainty and preference inputs in the form needed
for hybrid reasoning, though the procedures were logically sound.
Inquiry. Amos Tversky worked with Lindley and me  to make
hybrid tools more user friendly (Lindley, Tversky, & Brown, 1979).
For much of the next decade, colleagues and I continued to build-
test-build-test (e.g. Brown & Laskey, 1987), with many thousands
of dollars of government funding. That included an experimental
study sub-contracted to a psychology group at University of South-
ern California (Winterfeldt, Eppel, & Ford, 1988).
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Need. A hybrid issue which still needs methodological devel-
pment is a systematic method of “jiggling,” that is, adjusting the
nputs of incoherent models of the same judgment to remove inco-
erence in a way that accounts for the relative ﬁrmness of inputs.
 key outstanding problem is whether there is a unique reconcil-
ation of inputs that “ideally” ﬁts the assessor’s “mind-contents”
Brown, 2012a,b).
Inquiry. Supported by academic consultants and sub-contracts
o psychologists and statisticians, we developed and applied hybrid
rocedures for judgments of choice, preference and uncertainty.
e  paid particular attention to hybrid probability assessment.
amiliar statistical algorithms, involving the addition of variances
eﬂecting relative conﬁdence, do not properly capture the required
ogic.
More tentative insights on conﬂicting value judgments arose
uring consulting projects. One, involving NATO decision rules on
obilization in the face of an impending Soviet attack, called for
udgments on the relative seriousness of mobilizing too soon or too
ate (Brown, Kelly, Stewart, & Ulvila, 1977). Trade-offs elicited from
wo former generals were both 20 to one, but in opposite directions!
Aiding ﬁx. We  side-stepped this discordance by presenting the
efense client with the action implications of both value judgments
nd left him to use this as he saw ﬁt.
Another study, for nuclear regulators, called for value trade-off
f deaths versus infertilities due to radiation exposure. A survey of
take-holders produced dramatically different trade-offs, depend-
ng on whether the question was framed from the perspective of
he individual or of society.
.2. Decomposing estimation error
Puzzle. Early in my  career, I worked on projects to aid corporate
lients to make investment decisions, drawing on sample surveys
o estimate industrial population features, such as product demand.
Case: One such project required an estimate of the total number
f stationary diesels in the UK. We planned on using an estimate
ased on a sample survey by a major oil company, which reported
 “margin of error” of about 10%. We  then happened to learn about
nother sample survey, conducted by another oil company, which
roduced an estimate several times greater, again reporting a small
argin of error of only about 20%. This large discrepancy needed
o be explained.
Answer. Closer examination of the surveys, revealed that the
margins of error” only took account of random sampling error
hich was quite modest, due to a large sample sizes. Both ignored
ntirely the potentially much more serious errors, such as misre-
orting the number of diesels a company had and the fact that the
amples were taken, albeit randomly (so, no selection bias) from a
ampling frame quite different from the total population of com-
anies (such as trade association members). Our explanation was
wofold: random sampling error was the only one which could be
ascertained objectively”; and survey organizations have a ﬁnancial
otive to underplay possible errors in the surveys they conduct.
Aid need. A logically defensible procedure was needed for eval-
ating the inﬂuence on total survey error of judgments about
ndividual sources of error. The purpose of both was  to help plan
urveys to minimize total error and to interpret the reported results
f surveys.
Inquiry. This concern led me  and others to conduct research to
roduce an appropriate algorithm that would accept judgmental
nputs that informants were cognitively able to supply. This effort
ave rise to an applied statistics award (Brown, 1968) and a book
ength report (Brown, 1969) of the methodology (including math-
matics furnished by statistician John Pratt).
Problem formulation. An estimate of an uncertain quantity may
iffer from its true value by an error with several componentsmory and Cognition 4 (2015) 212–220 215
(expressed as a sum or product). Example: an estimate of 10,000
annual demand for widgets may  differ from actual demand because
of errors in number of customers, demand per customer; demand
per customer, sampled mis-measurement of sample, unrepresenta-
tive sampling frame, random sampling ﬂuctuations, non-response,
etc. Uncertainty about the total error, including mean (bias) and
dispersion, is implied by joint uncertainty about component errors.
“Decomposed error analysis” operationalises this connection.
Practice. We have since used variants of this methodology, in
planning and reporting sample-based studies (Fifty years later the
results of sample studies are still being routinely reported without
addressing errors other than random sampling ﬂuctuations, and
failing to mention this omission).
Case on measurement error. We  got a small federal grant to
assess the effectiveness of a national campaign to foster household
energy conservation through insulation. The agency had conducted
a phone survey of 20,000 households. which “found” that more than
half had fully implemented recommended insulation. We  phys-
ically inspecting a “calibration” sub-sample of 20 of the original
households, on the basis of which we concluded that average insu-
lation was  only 10–30% of that originally estimated by the large
survey! Exercises such as this has prompted of lines of research on
the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of assessing compo-
nents of estimation error realistically.
3.3. Ideal judgment
Puzzle. I noticed over the years, in both private and profes-
sional contexts, that people (myself included) commonly say that
a decider “should have known better than to.  . .”  This implied that
there was  some ideal decision that the decider was failing to make
– and that he would have made, had he only properly analyzed
what he knew. I could not ﬁnd this concept of ideal judgment in
the literature.
Answer. I have tried to interpret this ideal and used it, in a kind of
thought experiment, as a target to focus my prescriptive thinking –
analogous to the use of the perfect information construct in design-
ing an information gathering strategy (Brown, 2012a,b; Brown and
Lindley, 1982, page 12). A precise value might philosophically not
exist, but it might still serve as a useful directional guide (like a hiker
ﬁnds a compass useful, in spite of the fact that the needle is usually
ﬂuctuating). The ideal prescription concept allows the decider to
consider separately the potential for enhancing the rationality of
his or her decisions and how much that potential might actually be
realized. Judging how far the decider’s choices fall short of his ideal
prescription evaluates his room for improvement.
3.4. Organizational impediments to effective decision-aiding
Puzzle. Highly trained submarine commanders were judged by
their superior ofﬁcers to make poor decisions, based on underwater
battle ﬁeld exercises. They consistently ﬁred their torpedoes too
late at “enemy” submarines, thereby incurring unwise risks of being
detected and destroyed before ﬁring their own torpedoes.
Answer. Navy authorities concluded that sub commanders made
their poor time-of-ﬁre decisions because of insufﬁciently ratio-
nal decision-making. Accordingly, they charged us with developing
computerized decision models that would help commanders make
more rational decisions (Brown, Peterson, Shawcross, & Ulvila,
1975). After interviewing sub commanders, we  found little wrong
with their rationality. In career evaluations, they were rated on how
well they located enemy subs, not on whether they would have been
killed in real combat. Their problem was  with incentive, not ratio-
nality. The closer they got to the enemy, the better they could locate
him.
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Research lead. I recommended that our decision aiding assign-
ent should be replaced by one on organization design. The navy
eclined (with some irritation . . .)  and terminated our contract.
This experience and others like it led me  to conclude that the
ajor impediments to successful decision aiding in institutions
ave to do with organizational issues (followed by cognitive, and
astly by logical issues). In particular, aid is not adapted to the orga-
ization (Brown, 2000). The appropriate aid to use, if any, and how
o use it, depends on the institutional context, including decision
rocesses, interests to be served, reward structure, and commu-
ication channels. We  explored precepts for aiding organizations
ased on consulting experience, and speciﬁed further research to
evelop and authenticate general guidelines (Brown & Adelman,
987).
.5. Decision aid evaluation
Aid need. A persistent question, critical to justifying and making
ffective use of prescriptive decision analysis is: what beneﬁt, if
ny, does a decider gain from it?
Aid ﬁx. We  made several efforts to develop aid evaluation meth-
ds (Brown & Watson, 1977; Brown et al., 1975; Watson & Brown,
978; Brown, 1994a), including mathematical analysis and after-
ath evaluation. However, I know of little effort to apply these
r other approaches by anyone on real cases. The pros and cons,
nduring and passing, quantitative and implicit, of applied decision
heory in aiding individuals to make personal and civic choices are
ddressed in Brown (2012a).
Need. Reacting to mounting public concern about poor youth
ecisions concerning drugs, sex, school drop-out, etc., the National
nstitute of Child Health and Human Development funded us to
valuate the potential impact of decision training in Junior and High
chool.
Inquiry. With psychologist Jon Baron, we taught pilot courses at
ocal schools (Baron & Brown, 1991). The courses appeared to be
ell-received by students and teachers, who continued to teach
he courses afterwards. However, all our substantial funding was
onsumed by course development and we did not get around to
valuating them. In any case, I doubt if we could cost-effectively
valuate the impact of these courses on pilot students’ decisions.
nﬂuential interests expressed concern that students would be led
o the “wrong decisions”, and funding was discontinued.
Related need evaluating speciﬁc decision strategies. Simple
eneral-purpose strategies have been proposed, which call for
mpirical validation. A favorite of mine (based on a dictum of deci-
ion analyst Ron Howard), which I use – and urge on others, to use
ust before making almost any kind of decision is what I call “Going
hrough the HOOPS”.
It consists of ﬁve simple steps. H: Holistic judgment. What am
 intuitively inclined to do? O: Options. What can I do? O: Out-
omes. What might happen? P: Preferences. How would I like it?
: Synthesis. How do I put it all together?
It would be valuable to evaluate generic guidelines, (such as
OOPS), under various circumstances: Low stakes dilemmas (such
s planning a vacation); life-changing personal choices (such as
hether to marry a boyfriend); major government undertakings
such as in vesting billions of dollars on renovating infra-structure);
ollowed or preceded by different levels of formal or informal anal-
sis.
. New researchMy  research efforts to extract science from practice have usu-
lly gone no further than that required to support our immediate
iding methodology, as illustrated by the above cases. Appendix Amory and Cognition 4 (2015) 212–220
brieﬂy describes more cases. They all stop well short of deﬁnitive
and generalized scientiﬁc ﬁndings. In addition, there are at least
two major potential research areas that neither I, nor anyone else I
know of, have seriously grappled with.
4.1. Enhancing typically complex decision processes
Modeling a simple one-step discrete choice, such as making
a major purchase, is fairly straightforward. However, modeling
a messy, but effective, decision process is not straight forward
and it is more common. People commonly come to a decision
through a progression of incremental commitments, interleaved
with information-gathering, mental and other activities often in
parallel (Brown 2012b). The difﬁculty of dealing with this complex
case limits the practical usefulness of currently available decision
aids. Applied decision theory and other quantitative approaches to
decision aid normally presuppose fairly simple decision procedures
to choose among, for example, one-step options. As an illustration
of how many decisions unfold over time, take the following exam-
ple: You consider going for a swim. You test the water by putting
a toe in. If you ﬁnd it warm enough, you put your leg in up to the
knee, ﬁnd it too cold, cast around for another mode of exercise and
eventually settle on one, or perhaps give up on exercising now at
all.
There may  be signiﬁcant scientiﬁc progress on this issue but I
am not aware it. “Dynamic programming” is a theoretical paradigm
for optimizing such a “complex progression” decision process, but
it would be hopelessly burdensome to do it explicitly. In principle,
every step in a complex progression decision process, if wise, would
conform to a decider’s ideal judgment, but it would rarely be cost-
effective to do so with explicit modeling. A major part of the problem
is that the judgments called for at each step call for different degrees
of precision. (Example: Deciding to abandon a sinking ship may  call
for negligible reﬂection; whether to look for your valuables ﬁrst,
somewhat more; whether to take a cruise in the ﬁrst place may  take
substantial effort.) The precision that is necessary and sufﬁcient to
guide the decider through this process cost-effectively may  be quite
far from ideal. I have come across nothing better than to substitute
a notional one step commitment for the complex reality and adjust
for any mismatch.
More realistic example: a businessman is interested in possi-
bly marketing a new product. He could simplify his evaluation by
pretending he has to make an immediate full-scale product launch,
even though he would, in fact, proceed incrementally by “test mar-
keting” the product ﬁrst, He can adjust later for any advantage he
judges his real incremental option has over the one-step substitute
option. However, making that adjustment may  be more trouble and
no more ideal than taking the ﬁrst step intuitively.
5. Reconciling prescriptive modeling with intuition
How should a decider effectively integrate the results of a deci-
sion modeling exercise into his regular thinking, which includes his
intuition and regular informal reﬂection? So far as I know, the best
but unsatisfying default practice is for the decider to informally
digest the modeling exercise and dwell on any mismatch with his
informal thinking. How can this be improved?
Resolving this dilemma calls for hybrid reasoning (see above).
At some point – be it when evaluating contending aiding strate-
gies in advance or interpreting their ﬁndings after the fact – the
decider may  be left with two contending evaluations. One of them
merges whatever deliberate analyses, formal and informal, he has
undertaken. The other is his intuitive evaluation.
Formally, he can either pool or reconcile the two evaluations,
taking his relative conﬁdence in each evaluation into account, much
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s he would with two conﬂicting analyses. At its simplest, he would
lump for conclusions intermediate between the two, closer to the
ne in which he as most conﬁdence.
Alternatively, and ultimately more satisfactory, if it is feasible,
he decider would somehow adapt his intuition and/or delib-
rate analyses, so that they coincide. To do so, he would have
o understand descriptively the mental processes underlying his
naided intuitive choice well enough to prescribe how to practically
ransform that intuition into the ideal judgment that normatively
rocessing his updated mind-content would have produced. I cer-
ainly don’t have the cognitive qualiﬁcations to propose even a
lightly-baked idea for a feasible mode of intervention. Whoever
oes (perhaps someone already has) will initiate an important sci-
ntiﬁc contribution to decision-aiding practice.
. Conclusions
The views expressed in this paper are based on anecdotal evi-
ence, that is, on a sampling of my  own experience as one decision
ider/researcher. I hope others will balance this sample, and con-
rm, refute and/or amplify my  tentative generalizations.
I am acutely aware that, as a rank amateur in the scientiﬁc dis-
iplines into which I venture, I am liable to re-invent the wheel, but
mbarrassingly non-circular. I trust better-informed readers to set
e straight.
.1. Does decision science beneﬁt from decision aiding?
My,  possibly unrepresentative, experience suggests not only
hat decision-aiding practice has indeed the potential to beneﬁt
eciders, but also that little of this beneﬁt has been realized so far,
artly because of a lack of appropriately targeted decision research.
onversely, aiding practice can also greatly enhance the body of
ecision science, mainly by identifying and seeding major areas of
esearch that are neglected by the research community. (Science
oes not have to be utilitarian, but if the “real world” is crying out
or scientiﬁc development, that is surely enough reason for some
cientist to take notice.)
My  experience itself presents a puzzle (a meta-explicandum?).
lthough the scientiﬁc community has shown interest in my  work
over 2000 citations in refereed journals), I have not heard much
bout follow-up research that builds on it (other than by people
ho have worked directly with me), nor about the experience of
ther practitioners. A disconcerting possibility is that few, if any,
f my  research leads are worth following up. I prefer to think
hat the explanation has more to do with correctible dysfunctions
n the professional infrastructure. I believe the current institu-
ional environment of academia discourages ambitious researchers
rom pursuing productive prescriptive research (Brown, 2006).
areer incentives currently encourage adaptive mono-disciplinary
esearch, which embellishes existing themes, rather than pioneer-
ng new ones. As I have noted, effective decision methodology,
n the other hand, requires that a wide variety of conditions be
et: logical, psychological and organizational, and tends to call for
ntrinsically interdisciplinary research.
There is even a language barrier in the way of communicating
ecision related concepts across disciplinary boundaries (Howard,
004; Brown, 2004). A decision science jargon has crystallized,
hich is confusing or misleading to anyone who  has not been
ndoctrinated. I still have painful memories, from many years ago,
f presenting what I thought was a straightforward model-based
nvestment evaluation to the president of a high tech company.
fter listening for ten minutes, he muttered “gobbledegook!”,
tormed out and had nothing further to do with us.mory and Cognition 4 (2015) 212–220 217
6.2. Prospects of decision aiding and decision science contributing
to each other
It may  take developments in decision science infrastructure
to produce a favorable environment for developing much pro-
ductive synergy between decision aiding and decision science.
Impediments to prescription-oriented research may  not relax
until academic institutions and publications emerge dedicated to
prescriptive decision-making, unhitched from discipline-speciﬁc
departments such as statistics, psychology, management and eco-
nomics.
Perhaps an institute, journal and university departments ded-
icated solely to Prescriptive Decision Science would persuade
adventurous young scholars that a prescriptively oriented career
has ﬁrm and attractive prospects. They may thus be spared from
having to contrive unorthodox and risky career paths like mine,
which consisted of hop-scotching between academia and consul-
ting, and between diverse mono-disciplinary faculty employments.
The remedy to the language babel noted above may  be for a
respected body, comparable to “l’Académie Francaise”, to devise an
authorized decision glossary, which makes scientiﬁc jargon gener-
ally accessible. For instance, what is being called “decision analysis”,
“likelihood” and “dependent” would surely be better understood
as “applied decision theory” (Brown, 2004b, 2008), “diagnosticity”
and “co-varying”, respectively. Most people (even decision theo-
rists, in unguarded moments) misread “conﬁdence interval” as a
range of uncertainty (Brown, in press, includes a tentative glossary).
I am hopeful that decision-aiding practice and decision science
research can, indeed, be integrated into a productive symbiosis,
where aiders identify their research needs and communicate them
to scientists, who  respond effectively. We are not there yet – but
many are underway (Dietz et al., 2014).
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Appendix A. More “partly baked” research leads
Here are notes on some more incompletely researched topics.
A.1. Modeling subsequent acts
Method need. A decider will often take into account “subsequent
acts” which he does not yet commit to. Common decision tree
rollback procedures require modeling through “preposterior anal-
ysis”, which unrealistically treats one act as certain, conditional
on learning the intervening information modeled (see ﬁgure 41-
8 in Howard, Matheson, & North, 1977). For instance, the analysis
of a decision about whether to test market a new product might
specify alternative test results and, in each case, assume a subse-
quent product choice would certainly be yes or no, depending on
which appeared to have the higher conditional utility (according
to, say, a decision tree). By design or inadvertence, the conditions
that are modeled are rarely sufﬁcient to predict subsequent action
with certainty.
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Research lead. An alternative paradigm is proposed that treats
ubsequent acts as conditionally uncertain (Brown, 1978).
.2. Assessment uncertainty
Need. A methodology for representing assessment uncertainty
n a form where it can be understood, judgmentally checked and
ffectively implemented. For instance, my  50% probability of heads
n a coin toss is ﬁrm and unlikely to shift with new evidence, and
o has little assessment uncertainty. On the other hand, my  50%
robability of “other life in the universe” is very soft and has high
ssessment uncertainty.
Fix. An extension of well-established personal probability logic,
ith primary focus on predicting shifts in ﬁrst-order factual assess-
ents is proposed (Brown, 1990a).
Second puzzle. Even die-hard personalists speak of “the true risk”
f an event, which does not depend on a particular assessor.
Answer. An interpretation of impersonal probability compatible
ith a “Bayesian” perspective and which, unlike Carnap’s “logi-
al” probability, does not depend on information actually to hand
Brown, 1993b). Example: The impersonal probability that a cer-
ain reactor will melt down within a year, based on ideal analysis
f all feasible research, could be quite different from the probability
ased on ideal analysis of what we actually know.
.3. Misaligned aider priorities
Puzzle. The orientation of’ professional decision aiders may  dis-
ose them to attend to analytic processes more than to deciders’
eeds. Their analyses may  be technically sound, but disregard key
nowledge, make unrealistic assumptions, or answer the wrong
uestions.
Answer. A decision-aider’s primary motivations may  be pro-
essional standing and scientiﬁc satisfaction, especially if he has
cademic ambitions (Brown, 2005a).
.4. Evaluating analog aids
Need. Common aiding and assessment procedures can be
pproximated with graphic and other analog aids whose user-
riendliness advantages can be readily-appreciated. What they may
ose in normative validity is more difﬁcult to evaluate.
Fixes and leads. A physical balance-beam to compare the
expected” (probability-weighted) utilities of options was suc-
essfully tested by having subjects judge by eye which way a
orresponding beam would tip (Martin & Brown, 1991).
Case study. During a seventh-grade class to help me  decide
hether to replace an arthritic hip, I wanted pupils to evaluate
he probability-weighted outcome of my  options, testing differ-
nt factual and value judgments (“sensitivity analysis”). To reduce
ognitive burden and ﬁt the time constraint of a single class, we
sed a balance-beam as an exact analog, varying weights and dis-
ances in real-time. We  found that pupils were unerringly accurate
n instantly predicting which way the beam would tip. A testable
ypothesis: this is a general skill, which would obviate the need
or an actual balance-beam. The manipulable image of one would
ufﬁce. The normative validity of a graphic analog of a “decom-
osed error” estimation algorithm was established mathematically
Brown & Pratt, 1996).
Example. A market researcher is deciding whether to estimate
nnual demand for widgets with a small sample of personal inter-
iews or a large mail sample. The various sources of error, such as
umber of customers, random sampling ﬂuctuations and measure-
ent error, are assessed probabilistically for each survey method.
he implied overall accuracy of each method could be calcu-
ated mathematically, but converting assessments into shapes andmory and Cognition 4 (2015) 212–220
summing areas by eye, is cognitively more accessible. The offsetting
approximation error is evaluated.
A.5. Effect of incentives on allocating resources in acceptable risk
evaluation
Need. The Department of Energy was spending billions of dollars
on evaluating whether a nuclear waste dump-site was  acceptably
safe. We  were charged with advising the agency head on how these
funds should be allocated in the public interest.
Inquiry. My  analysis indicated major redistribution of funds
among research targets, and derivatively among major research
contractors. Those contractors who  would lose business lobbied
successfully for my consulting contract to be cancelled (Brown,
2005a).
Research lead. Accounting for motivational distortions in insti-
tutions purportedly serving the public good.
A.6. A new ﬁeld of risk research
Need. Evaluating diffuse risks from adversarial sources is a top-
ical new area of risk analysis, in which the risks are multiple and
diffuse and the source of risk is a human adversary (e.g. computer
security, sabotage, nuclear theft, terrorism and military combat).
For instance, how to choose among strategies to combat Islam-
oriented terrorism. The ﬁeld has distinctive methodological needs.
Research lead. Risk analysis methods explored address: formu-
lating and evaluating risk consequences, predicting adversarial
behavior and complex risk aftermaths, institutional and social
values, and choosing and implementing options (Brown, 1990b).
Technical approaches include game theory, macro-models, hybrid
reasoning, multi-attribute utility, step-through simulation, and
interactive decision theory
Examples
• Pros and cons of authorizing torture when interrogating terror-
ism suspects.
• Comparing counter-sabotage measures at chemical plants
• Approving or not 2015 Iran nuclear deal (See Section A8 below)
A.7. Evaluating the cost-effectiveness of legislation
Need. Various time-pressured US Congressional committees
sought help choosing what legislation to authorize.
Inquiry. Congressional bills evaluated included whether to
require any executive action involving more than $100 million to
be supported by “structured analysis”, and whether to authorize
$40 million a year on community anti-crime.
Research lead. Parametric applied decision theory models, which
permitted congressmen and bureaucrats to keep their sensitive
value judgments private., e.g. “electoral security”, “administrative
morale” (empire building), the “hullabaloo” factor (avoiding polit-
ical embarrassment).
A.8. Simulating option aftermaths
Need. A way of simulating uncertain option aftermaths, without
having to specify all possible paths in advance.
Lead. “Step-Through” simulation, like regular Monte Carlo,
involves sampling possible aftermaths of an initial action, and gen-
erating a distribution of outcome values for it (Brown & Ulvila,
1976). However, the detailed structure and/or assessments of the
decision model are elicited as called for in the execution of each
trial.
Example. The probable aftermaths of approving or rejecting an
Iran deal are assessed and sampled accordingly. Unlike traditional
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onte Carlo simulation, steps not taken are ignored for any given
rial. Imaginary trial sequence: Iran breaches deal (30%); rapidly
evelops bomb (60%); Israel attacks (80%); No general Middle East
ar (10%); and so on. Utility of complete sequence is evaluated.
rials are iterated and treated as a random sample from target
ssessment.
.9. Other research ideas
My  consulting methodology raised unresolved scientiﬁc issues
nd prompted tentative researchable ideas, such as the following.
Macro-models, whose inputs are the outputs of “feeder” mod-
els (Brown & Ulvila, 1991; Brown & Feuerwerger, 1978). Case:
a parametric decision rule the “level-of-control” for hazardous
chemical operations, where the parameters, such as substance
volatility are derived from subsidiary models (Mendez, Brown, &
Bresnick, 1984).
Decision rules for selecting an aid for a decision situation, codi-
fying decision-aider judgment (Brown & Ulvila, 1977). Case: Is it
worth spending $100k to determine if a nuclear waste dump is
acceptably safe?
Predicong individual and institutional non-optimizing actions.
Case: What are the chances that NATO will mobilize under the
misguided belief that Russia is about to attack (Brown et al.
1977)?
Sampling heterogeneous populations, with periodic and judg-
mental non-random sampling (Brown & Mayer, 1965) and a
stratiﬁed business sampling frame (Brown & Jackson, 1964).
Evaluating prospective non-repeatable organizational innova-
tions (Brown & Watson, 1977). (Case: a new management system)
Principles of rational regulation (Brown, 1994b; Brown, 2011a;
Brown, Flanders, & Larichev, 1997; Brown, 2002).
Communicating risk analysis ﬁndings to managers and other lay
professionals (Brown, 2011b).
Case illustrated comparison of numerical vs. verbal prescriptive
decision analysis (Larichev & Brown, 2000).
Evaluating “Anything else”: unspeciﬁed and as-yet unrecognized
possible options, outcomes or preferences (Brown, 2005c, sec.
10.6.1).
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